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Abstract
Tuning one’s shower in some hotels may turn into a challenging coordination game with imperfect
information. The temperature sensitivity increases with the number of agents, making the problem
possibly unlearnable. Because there is in practice a finite number of possible tap positions, identical
agents are unlikely to reach even approximately their favorite water temperature. We show that
a population of agents with homogeneous strategies is evolutionary unstable, which gives insights
into the emergence of heterogeneity, the latter being tempting but risky.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Taking a shower can turn into a painful tuning and retuning game when many people take
a shower at the same time if the flux of hot water is insufficient. In this fascinating game,
it is in the interest of everybody not only to reach an agreeable equilibrium temperature
but also to avoid large fluctuations. These two goals are difficult to achieve because one
inevitably not only has incomplete information about the behavior and personal preferences
of the other bathers, but also about the non-linear intricacies of the plumbing system.
The central issue of this paper is to find the conditions under which the agents are satisfied,
which depends on the learning procedure and on its parameters.
The need to depart from rational representative agents was forcefully voiced among others
by Kirman [1] and Arthur and Brian Arthur, for instance in his El Farol bar problem [2],
subsequently simplified as Minority Game [3, 4], from which we shall borrow some ideas
concerning the learning mechanism. In these models, the agents try to behave maximally
differently from each other, hence the need for heterogeneous agents.
The Shower Temperature Problem is different in that the perfect equilibrium is obtained
when all the agents behave exactly in the same optimal, unique way. A priori, it is a perfect
example of a case where the representative agent approach applies fully. As we shall see,
however, because in practice there is a maximum number of tap tuning settings, it may pay
off to be heterogeneous with respect to the strategy sets. Therefore, the problem we propose
in this paper is another example of a situation where heterogeneity is tempting because
potentially beneficial. The intrinsic and strong non-linearity of the temperature response
function prevents the use of the mathematical machinery for heterogeneous systems that
successfully solved the Minority Game [4, 5], the El Farol bar problem [6] and the Clubbing
problem [7].
II. THE SHOWER TEMPERATURE PROBLEM
One of the problems of poor plumbing systems is the interaction between the water temper-
atures of all the people taking a shower simultaneously. If one person changes her shower
setting, she influences the temperature of all the other bathers. Cascading shower tuning
and retuning may follow. A key issue is how people can learn from past temperature fluc-
tuations how to tune their own shower so as to obtain an average agreeable temperature Tˆ ,
and also to avoid large temperature fluctuations.
Some rudimentary shower systems allow only for one degree of freedom, the desired fraction
of hot water in one’s shower water, denoted by φ ∈ [0, 1]. Assuming that H and C denote
the maximal fluxes of hot and cold water available to a shower, and that the total flux at
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this shower is constant, the obtained temperature is equal to
T =
φHTH + CTC(1− φ)
φH + C(1− φ)
, (1)
where TH and TC denote the constant temperatures of hot and cold water.
In the following, we shall consider the special case were H = C, TC = 0, and TH = 1, which
amounts to express T in TH units, i.e., to rescale T by TH , which leads to T = φ.
The situation may become more complex however if many people take a shower at the same
time. Indeed, it sometimes happens that altogether the N bathers ask for a larger hot water
flux than the plumbing system can provide, a feature more likely found in old-style youth
hostels than in more upmarket hotels (hence the title). Assume that the total available hot
water flux for all bathers together is H while the cold water flux available at each single
shower is C = H . We denote by Φ =
∑N
i=1 φi the total fraction of asked hot water. If Φ > 1,
each agent will only receive φi/Φ instead of φi and the total flux of hot water she obtains is
smaller than expected.[8] Finally, agent i obtains
Ti =
φi
φi +Ψ(1− φi)
, (2)
where Ψ = max(1,Φ). Clearly, Ti(φi = 0) = 0 and Ti(φi = 1) = 1. When Φ ≤ 1, this
equation reduces to the no-interaction case Ti = φi. Therefore, provided that Φ > 1, the
agents interact through the temperature they each obtain, that is, via Φ. Assuming no inter-
agent communication, the global quantity Φ is the only means of interaction. Therefore, this
model is of mean-field nature. Henceforth, we consider the more involved case of interaction,
i.e., Φ > 1.
III. TUNING ONE’S SHOWER
A. Equilibrium and sensitivity: the homogeneous case
Before setting up the full adaptive agent model, we shall discuss the homogeneous case where
φi = φ.
Assuming that all the agents have the same favorite temperature (Tˆi = Tˆ ≤ 1), they do not
interact if N ≤ 1/Tˆ , in which case φ = Tˆ . If N > 1/Tˆ the equilibrium is reached when
φ = φeq = 1−
1
N
(
1
Tˆ
− 1
)
. (3)
Hence, there is always a φ that satisfies everybody (for instance, setting Tˆ = 1/2 leads to
φeq = 1 − 1/N). In equilibrium each agent actually gets φeqH/(N · φeq) = C/N hot water
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FIG. 1. Individual temperature as a function of φ in the homogeneous case for increasing N (from
top to bottom).
instead of φeqH and thus a total water flux of C/N + (1− φeq)C = C/(NTˆ ). Hence, indeed
the desired temperature Tˆ is reached for every agent, but the total water flux per agent is
quite small for large N .
The sensitivity of T to φ, defined as χ = dTdφ =
N
[1+N(1−φ)]2
is an increasing function of φ
and maximal at φ = 1 (a similar result also holds for Ti =
φi
φi+Φ(1−φi)
). The problem is
that χ(φeq) = NTˆ
2 ∝ N ; therefore, as N increases, tuning φ around φeq becomes more and
more difficult, suggesting already that the agents might experience difficulties to learn how
to tune their shower. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon: as N increases, the region in
which most of the variation of T occurs shrinks substantially.
This problem is made worse by the fact that, in practice, there is only a finite number Smax of
φs that can be effectively used by the agents, mostly because of internal tap static friction—
the larger the friction, the smaller the number of different achievable φs. Assuming that
the resolution in φ is δφ, or equivalently that S = 1/(δφ) values of φ are usable, it becomes
impossible to tune one’s shower if |T (φeq±δφ)−Tˆ | ≃ χ(φeq)δφ is larger than some acceptable
value. As χ ∝ N around φeq, S ∝ N is needed; as a consequence, the ideal temperature is
not learnable beyond a number of agents, which is for a large part pre-determined by the
plumbing system.
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B. Learning
The question is how to reach φeq. In this model, it is hoped that the agents have a common
interest to avoid large fluctuations of Ti around their favorite temperature Tˆi: the Shower
Temperature Problem is a repeated coordination game (cf. [9] and [10]) with many agents
and limited information.
The dynamics of the agents are fully determined by their possible tap settings, thereafter
called strategies, and by the trust they have in them. Each agent i has S possible strategies
φi,s with s = 1, ..., S chosen in [0, 1] before the game begins and kept constant afterwards
(how to choose the φs is discussed in the next section). The typical resolution in φ is 1/S;
for the same reason, the typical maximal φi over all the agents is of order 1 − 1/S. This
paper follows the road of inductive behavior advocated by Brian Arthur: to each possible
choice φi,s agent i attributes a score Ui,s(t) (where t denotes the time step of the game),
which describes its cumulated payoff at time t. The agents choose probabilistically their φi,s
according to a logit model P (φi(t) = φi,s) = exp(ΓUi,s(t))/Z, where Z is a normalization
factor and Γ is the rate of reaction to a relative change of Ui,s.
If one were to follow blindly El Farol bar problem and Minority Game literature, one would
write
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t) + φi,s
[
Tˆi − Ti(t)
]
.
When S > 2, such payoffs are not suitable any more, as the agents switch between their
highest and smallest φi,s, the intermediate ones being sometimes used only because of fluc-
tuations induced by the stochastic strategy choice. A payoff allowing for a gradual increase
of φi,s is necessary. Absolute value-based payoffs are fit for this purpose[8]: mathematically,
Ui,s(t + 1) = Ui,s(t)−
∣∣∣Tˆi − Ti(t)
∣∣∣ .
This payoff however does not depend on φi,s. As a consequence, all the strategies have the
same payoff. Therefore, one has to give more information to the agents. An agent that has
perfect information about the plumbing system, the temperatures and fluxes of hot and cold
water — for instance the plumber that built the whole installation — may know precisely
which temperature she would have obtained, had she played φi,s′ instead of her chosen
action φi,si(t). Such people are probably not very frequent amongst the general population,
however. This is why we shall consider an in-between case, where the agents’ estimation of
Ti,s(t) is a linear interpolation between the temperature of the strategy currently in use, i. e.
Ti(t) = Ti,si(t) and its correct virtual value. The payoff is therefore
Ui,s(t+ 1) = Ui,s(t)(1− λ)− λ
∣∣∣Tˆi − (1− η)Ti(t)− ηTi,s(t)
∣∣∣ , (4)
where η ∈ [0, 1] encodes the ability of the agents to infer the influence of φi,s on the real
temperature and 0 ≤ λ < 1 introduces an exponential decay of cumulated payoffs, with
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typical score memory length ∝ 1/λ. The parameter η is related to the difference between
naive and sophisticated agents as defined by Rustichini [11]. The first kind of agents believe
that they are faced with an external process, i. e. that they do not contribute to Φ, whereas
sophisticated agents are able to compute Φ−i = Φ− φi. In this model, perfect sophisticated
agents have η = 1.
IV. RESULTS
It is natural to measure two collective quantities, the average temperature T obtained by
the agents and its average distance from ideal temperature averaged over all the agents,
denoted by ∆T = T − Tˆ ; this characterizes the average temperature obtained by the agents,
or how far the agents are collectively from their goal. The individual dissatisfaction is
the distance from the ideal temperature for a given agent; one therefore measures it with
|δT | = 1
N
∑N
i=1 |Ti − Tˆi|; it is a measure of the average risk.
All the quantities reported here are measured in the stationary state over 10, 000 time steps
for Tˆ = 0.5, η = 1, λ = 0.001 and if not stated differently N = 20, after an equilibration
time of 30/(λΓ). The stationary state does not depend much on λ. On the other hand, the
performance of the population is of course improved as η increases and saturates for η > 0.5.
The role of Γ is discussed below.
A. Homogeneous population
Since the equilibrium is reached when all the agents tune their shower in exactly the same
way, trying first homogenous agents (or equivalently a representative agent) makes sense a
priori. We shall therefore set φi,s = φs =
s
S+1
, s = 1, ..., S so that the agents avoid using
only hot or cold water.
Agents with homogeneous strategies have a peculiar way of converging to their ideal tem-
perature as S increases. Figure 2 displays the oscillations of the reached temperature with
decreasing amplitude as a function of S. The asymmetric upward and downward slopes are
due to the asymmetry of T around φeq, as seen in Fig. 1. Theoretically, this can easily be
explained by assuming that all the agents select the same s that gives T as close as possible
to Tˆ . If s was a real number, sˆ = [1 − 1/N(1/Tˆ − 1)](S + 1). The choice of the agents
therefore is limited to [sˆ] and [sˆ] + 1 where [x] is the integer part of x (one may need to
enforce [sˆ] < S when S < N). T ([sˆ]) and T ([sˆ] + 1) are alternatively closest to Tˆ , therefore
this actual optimal temperature Tth (whichever T ([sˆ]) or T ([sˆ] + 1)) oscillates around Tˆ , as
seen in Fig. 2. The period of the oscillations is N , and their amplitude decreases as 1/S.
As expected, a very large value of Γ replicates closely the dented nature of the value of Tth,
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FIG. 2. Temperature T reached by homogeneous agents as a function of S for various Γ. Inset: T
vs. (S+1)/N , showing the scaling property of T , with N = 10, 20, 40 (asterisks, triangles, crosses).
in which case all the agents take the same choice even close to the peak of Tth. Generally,
smaller Γs (at least to a certain degree) lead to better average temperatures as it allows to
play mixed strategies, and thus combine two temperature so as to achieve a collective aver-
age result closest to Tˆ . From that point of view, Γ = 50 is a better choice than Γ = 1000.
Hence, there exists an optimal global value of Γ, leading to a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
This is because taking stochastic decisions is a way to overcome the rigid structure imposed
on the strategy space, whose inadequacy is reinforced by the strong non-linearity of T (φ).
Too small a Γ is detrimental as it allows for using φ further away from φeq; because of the
shape of T (φ), those with smaller φ are more likely to be selected.
The individual dissatisfaction |δT | unsurprisingly mirrors |∆T | since all the players are
identical. Both quantities are the same for large Γ as everybody plays the same fixed
strategy. |δT | also decreases as 1/S (see Fig. 5). However, the larger Γ, the smaller |δT |, as
each agent manages to get closer to the optimal choice.
It is easy to obtain analytical insights by solving the stationary state equations for Ui,s (4).
For the sake of simplicity, assuming that η = 1 and that only the two φs surrounding φeq, i. e.
[sˆ] and [sˆ] + 1, denoted by − and + respectively, are used, one obtains the set of equations
(independent from λ and i)
Ui,± = U± = −|T± − Tˆ | (5)
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FIG. 3. Temperature T reached by homogeneous agents as a function of S for Γ = 100. Squares:
theory, circles: numerical simulations. Inset: average deviation I from Tˆ versus Γ (same parame-
ters); the dotted lines are for eye guidance only.
where
Ti,± = T± =
1
1 + N+φ++N−φ−
φ±
(1− φ±)
(6)
with N± = N · P (s = ±), where P (s = +) =
exp(ΓUi,+)
exp(ΓUi,+)+exp(ΓUi,−)
and P (s = −) = 1− P (s =
+) is a Logit model for the two-strategy case S = 2. Figure 3 shows the good agreement
between numerical simulations and this simple theory, especially in the convex part of the
oscillations, as long as Γ is large enough to prevent the use of more than 2 strategies.
Being faced with oscillations (as a function of S or N) of the expected value of T is prob-
lematic for homogeneous agents since they do not know N a priori and because N may vary
with time, leading to dramatic shifts of Tˆ . In addition, since all the agents select the same
φ for large Γ, not a single agent is ever likely to reach a temperature close to Tˆ . The agents
do not know whether on average they will overheat or chill. A way to measure this uncer-
tainty is to measure the average |∆T | over S in numerical simulations, for instance with
I =
∑5N
S=N |∆T |/(4N).[12] The inset of Fig 3 reports that the minimum of I is at Γ ≃ 42
for the chosen parameters, which shows the existence of an optimal learning rate. Since the
individual satisfaction is maximal in the limit Γ→∞ (see above) there is no minimum of a
similar measure for |δT |.
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FIG. 4. Absolute temperature deviation |∆T | reached by homogeneous (squares) and heterogeneous
(circles) agents as a function of S for Γ = 100. Average over 500 samples for heterogeneous agents.
B. Heterogeneous populations
There are many ways for agents to be heterogeneous. One could imagine to vary S, Γ, η,
λ or Tˆ amongst the agents. Here we focus on strategy heterogeneity, i. e. the agents face
showers with different tap settings: the strategy space of agent i is no longer 1
S+1
, . . . , S
S+1
,
but now each agent has an individual strategy space where each strategy φi,s, s = 1, . . . , S,
is assigned a random number from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] before the simulation.
Intuitively, the effect of heterogeneity is to break the structural rigidity of the strategy
set of a representative agent. Figure 4 reports that |∆T | does not oscillate, but converge
(from below) faster than S−1 to zero. Homogeneous agents might achieve a better average
temperature depending on N and S, but on the whole clearly perform collectively worse.
This is simply because most likely homogeneous agents have a φ whose difference with φeq is
smaller than 1/(S+1) In addition, heterogeneous agents expect to have a smaller than ideal
temperature, but on average predictably smaller, with no strong dependence on S. Thus,
the expectation over the temperature of the agents is much improved by heterogeneity.
However, looking at the average absolute individual deviation from Tˆ reveals that the un-
certainty brought by heterogeneity is considerably worse on average. Plotting |δT | for both
types of agents shows that |δT | is always smaller for homogeneous agents (Fig. 5). This
means that if being heterogeneous is more risky. Which agent (or equivalently, shower)
performs better depends not only on N , but also on the tuning settings of all the agents.
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FIG. 5. Individual dissatisfaction |δT | reached by homogeneous (empty squares) and heterogeneous
agents (full circles) as a function of S for Γ = 1000. Average over 500 samples for heterogeneous
agents. Dashed line: theoretical predictions.
C. Homegeneous vs heterogeneous
Heterogeneity may be tempting as it suppresses the systematic abrupt oscillations experi-
enced by homogeneous populations when N changes and is collectively better on average.
However, heterogeneous showers are potentially more risky. In other words, the agents must
consider the trade-off between the temptation of an expected better temperature and a
potentially larger deviation.
The situation discussed above is only global. Does it pay to be heterogeneous for a single
agent? An answer comes from a system consisting of N − 1 homogeneous agents as defined
above and a single random one with random φi,ss. The fraction f of the runs at fixed S
that give a better δTi to the homogeneous showers is reported in Fig. 6; this quantity
indicates that the majority of heterogeneous agents are not worse off for about a quarter of
the values of S. This finding is not in contradiction with the fact that the average personal
dissatisfaction of heterogeneous agents is always larger than that of homogeneous agents:
|δT | is much influenced by large deviations contributed by a minority of agents because
of large temperature sensitivity to small deviations in φ. Finally, the advantage of the
homogeneous population increases with Γ, as a large learning rate helps only using one’s
best strategy.
Let us finally give to all agents the possibility to use either strategies from the homogeneous
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FIG. 6. Fraction of the runs for which a single heterogeneous agent is worse off than the other
N − 1 homogeneous agents; Γ = 1000 (crosses) and Γ = 30 (circles). Average over 2000 samples.
set, or strategies drawn at random. A simple way to achieve this is to give the agents
2S strategies, S of them defined homogeneously, and S of them drawn at random before
the game begins. We shall then be interested in fh, the average fraction of players using
strategies from the homogeneous set. It turns out that when η = 1, this fraction fluctuations
as a function of S, for instance, but remains roughly constant. A more interesting behaviour
come from varying η (see Fig. 7). When η = 0, the population is not expected to show
any preference since all the score updates are the same for a given agent. Then, as η is
increased, the discrimination power of the agents improves. Quite peculiarly, a peak of
advantageous homongeneity arises around η ≃ 0.3. The saturation of fh ≃ 0.42 for η > 0.5
shows that in that case most agents stick to a heteregeneous strategy. Still, homogeneity and
heterogeneity coexist. This probably comes from the statistical properties of distributions of
random strategies around φeq together with the very strong non-linearity of Tˆ as a function
of φ
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As a final note, minimizing |∆T | is equivalent to solving a number partitioning problem
[13] in which one splits a set of N numbers ai > 0 into two subsets, so that the sums
of the numbers in the subsets are as close as possible, which amounts to minimize C =
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FIG. 7. Fraction of the agents using one of their homogeneous strategies as a function of η; Γ = 100.
Average over 2000 samples.
|
∑
i siai| where si = ±1; it is an NP-complete problem; in other words, the only way to
find the absolute minimum of C is to sample all the 2N configurations. Let us consider
an even simpler version of the Shower Temperature Problem that makes more explicit its
NP-complete nature. Each agent i is given ai and plays φeq + siai, si = ±1. Neglecting the
self-impact on the resulting temperature and the non-linearity of the temperature response,
the analogy between the Shower Temperature Problem and the number partitioning problem
is straightforward. Methods borrowed from statistical mechanics show that the average
optimal C scales as 2−N , which requires to enumerate the 2N possible configurations [14].
This is much better than what the agents achieve; the reason for this discrepancy is that the
agents do not reach a stationary state in O(expN) time steps, hence, they cannot sample all
the possible configurations. Another reason is that the optimal solution may require some
agents to use a strategy that would yield a worse temperature than their optimal choice.
In conclusion, the Shower Temperature Problem shows the subtle trade-offs between a homo-
geneous population with equally spaced actions and a fully random one. In a system where
the agents’ action space is not likely to include the optimal equilibrium choice, heterogeneity
is a way to solve more robustly, with less systematic deviation on a collective level this kind
of problem, at the expense of a higher risk for individual agents. In other words, if given
the choice, some agents favoured by randomness will take the opportunity to improve their
fate. Therefore even simple situations where a simple representative agent approach yields
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a unique optimal choice, it may not be reachable because of practical constraints. And thus
heterogeneity emerges.
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